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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
STATUTES IMPOSING DOUBLE LIABILITY
UPON STOCKHOLDERS.
The pronounced tendency now prevailing in the United
States to extend and more rigorously to enforce the obligations
of corporations, their officers and directors, has brought with it
a corresponding tendency to enlarge the obligations of stock-
holders. This is not entirely a logical result, for the stock-
holder, as such, has no direct voice in the management of the
enterprise, and if he be of the bare minority, he has not even a
voice in the selection of its personnel.
Along with the tremendous increase in corporate investments,
however, stockholders have become so widely distributed through-
out all classes of the community that the suggestions for
legislation for protecting "the public" have gradually come
to embrace their. interests as well, in order to prevent injustice
from being visited upon them through fraud and over capitali-
zation. In other words, the interests of stockholders can no
longer be considered apart from that of "the public." But
though the subject has been discussed as having a bearing on
the welfare of our entire commercial system, the movement is
yet only in its infancy.
The experience of Continental Europe has been essentially
different from our own in this respect, for, from the very begin-
ning of the history of the corporation considered as a commercial
and legal entity; safeguards were thrown around its formation,
so as to simultaneously protect the credit-extending public and
the stockholder. Both in France and in Germany, the state
must be taken into the confidence of the organizers (fondateurs,
Gruwnder) and some particular arm of the government is entrusted
with the task of determining (i) whether all the legal formalities
have been complied with and (2) whether the capital paid in
represents actual value. So too, there are further safeguards
when the organizers come to sell their stock to others.'
x. See Lehman, Das Recht der Aktiengesellschaften (1898) Vol. I. p. j63
et seq.
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With the details of these provisions we are not now concerned,
but it is recognized that many of the evils in our own system
have resulted from the eitreme laxity of the law in respect of
capitalization. The exact definition and the cure of these evils
are, however, problems rather of economics than of law, but as
so frequently happens, a certain impulse or direction has been
given to the development of the law, because some economic
result has been considered by the court as necessary or desirable.
It is not at all improbable that if the legislatures of the States
had recognized at an early day that the evils attending the
corporate form were due to the latitude given in respect of
capitalization, there would have been no departure from the
ordinary type of corporation, with a liability on the part of stock-
holders, limited to their investment. To compel strictness in
capitalization was, for a long time, considered unsuitable to a
young and growing country, but in the absence of reform in this
direction came a policy in some States to hold responsible the
living men standing back of the lifeless and soulless entity of
the corporation. An example of this policy is furnished by the
Constitution of Kansas which was made to provide as follows :2
Dues from corporations shall be secured by individual liability of the
stockholders to an additional amount equal to the stock owned by each stock-
holder, and such other means as shall be provided by law. * * *
This provision of the Constitution stands now quite alone;
there are no longer any legislative provisions in Kansas prescrib-
ing the manner of enforcing the liability, as all prior statutes
relating thereto were repealed in 1903. 3 The amplifying Act of
x868, 4 however, provided that suit might be brought by a creditor
of a dissolved corporation with debts unpaid, against any stock-
holder holding stock at the time of dissolution, without joining
the corporation. After execution had been returned unsatisfied
against the corporation, execution might be issued on the same
judgment, upon motion, against any stockholder, to an amount
equal to the amount of stock held by him; the stockholder was
then entitled to contribution from fellow-stockholders. 4
No legal objection is presented in the ordinary case to the
enforcement of such a liability within the State of Kansas,
against one of its citizens, but as soon as an attempt is made to
execute the liability without the jurisdiction i1n which it was
enacted, numerous problems are presented. In the case of
2. Sec. 2, Art. 12.
3. Laws of x9o3, ch. zs2.
4. Gen. Stats. (1868) ch. 23.
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Whitman v. Oxford National Bank5 a creditor of a Kansas cor-
poration brought an action to enforce the double liability in the
Federal courts within the State of New York against a stock-
holder resident in the latter State. The New York law recognizes
no liability to creditors of stockholders in such corporations after
the capital stock has been paid in. 6 The United States Supreme
Court held that the obligation imposed by the Kansas statute
was "contractual in its nature" though "statutory in its origin,"
and hence enforceable in a foreign jurisdiction. The reasoning
of the opinion is not close and its language should be taken in a
very broad sense and for the purposes of the argument then at
hand, which was to demonstrate that the liability was not penal
in the international sense.
We may assume that the liability is not penal, at least under
the test finally adopted by the Supreme Court in Huntin-
ton v. Atrill,7 pursuant to which, only such laws are penal which
impose punishment for an offense against the State. Though
opposed to many State court decisions, 8 the test is now whether
the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a
wrong to the individual. But it is nowhere intimated that
because a statute is not penal, it is therefore enforceable extra-
territorially. The term "contractual" must be taken in some
broader sense as applicable to an obligation resulting indirectly
from some voluntary act of the stockholder, not in its usual
sense of an obligation directly assumed or within the contempla-
tion of the party when the voluntary act was performed. Even
if this were not so and the obligation be deemed contractual in
the strict sense, to whom was the promise made? Not to the
creditor, because his debt may not even have been incurred at
the time of the subscription to, or the purchase of the stock; and
not to the corporation, because the creditor does not claim
through it and, in fact, it is precisely the debt of the corporation
which the stockholder is being asked to pay.
The Supreme Court thus gave extraterritorial force to an
obligation implied only in the Constitution and laws of Kansas.
5. (1899) 176 U. S. 559.
6. See Marshall v. Sherman (1895) 148 N. Y. 9.
7. (1892) r46 U. S. 657. The statute held not to be penal in the inter-
national sense was one rendering officers of a corporation individually liable
for its debts in the event of filing a false report. The Supreme Court had
already held that such statutes must be strictly construed. Chase v. Curtis
(1885) 113 U. S. 452; Flash v. Corn (1883) 109 U. S. 37x.
8. Derrickson v. Smith (x858) 27 N. J. Law 166; Halsey v. McLean,
(r866) 12 Allen 438; Bank v'. Price (1870) 33 Md. 487.
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As was well said by the New York Court of Appeals in refusing
to enforce this same statue: "the plaintiff's right of -action has
no other legal or moral basis than the fiat of a legislature of
another State." 9  As the statutes of one State have, exfroprio
vigore, no force or effect in another, the decision must rest
exclusively upon the basis of comity, although the decisions of
State courts as to the extension of comity are not reviewable by
the Supreme Court.1 0 Now, as we have seen, the State of the
Federal district wherein the action of Whitman v. Oxford Nat.
Bank was brought, has refused to extend to the Kansas statute
the comity of its own jurisdiction, yet the Federal court, in
exercise of its concurrent jurisdiction has in effect laid down a
contrary rule. It is also contrary to the rule applied to the
same statute in many other States."'
There are, perhaps, certain considerations other than legal
which influence the Supreme Court in this class of cases. At
least an intimation of this is given in the dictum of Mr. Justice
Brewer in the Whitman case (supra). On page 563 of the report,
he says:
In view of the present tendency to carry on business through corporate
instrumentalities and the freedom from personal liability which attends
ordinary corporate action, it cannot be said that this limited additional
remedy is open to judicial condemnation.
The significance of the decision, however, extends far beyond
the "limited additional remedy" which the statute affords, for
there would be no difference in principle had the statute enacted
a treble, quadruple or even an unlimited liability.
The State of Minnesota has likewise embodied the principle
of double liability in its Constitution. 
1 2
Each stockholder in any corporation (excepting those organized for the
purpose of carrying on any kind of manufacturing or mechanical business)
shall be liable to the amount of stock held or owned by him.
9. Marshall v. Sherman (i8gs) 148 N. Y. 9, 24.
io. Finney v. Guy (i9o2) 189 U. S. 335, in which the court attempts to
distinguish Whitman v. Oxford Nat. Bank (supra) and Hancock Nat.
Bank v. Farnum (i9oo) i76 U. S. 64o.
xi. Bank of North America v. Ridge (i8g
i ) 154 Mass. 203; Fowler v.
Lamson (1893) 146 Ill. 472; Cri ipen v. Laighton (1899) 69 N. H. 540. In
another group of decisions, the denial of extraterritorial force to such statutes
is placed upon the ground that the local forum is not adapted to the remedy
provided. Bates v. Day (i9oz) x98 Pa. 513; Bank v. Benson (Igoo) zo6 Wis.
624; Russell v. Pacific R. Co. (i896) 113 Cal. 258.
12. Art. 10, Sec. 3.
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The amplifying act as embodied in the Revised Statutes of
x878 and as re-enacted in z894,13 provided for sequestration pro-
ceedings in the event of an unsatisfied execution, and if it should
appear that the corporation be insolvent, the court might ascer-
tain the respective liabilities of the stockholders and compel each
to pay an additional sum not exceeding the amount of his stock.
Under this Act, it was held that the proceeding was in equity, to
which all the creditors and all the stockholders must be parties,
so that the liability might be properly apportioned.' 4 Accord-
ingly, the United States Supreme Court held in Hale v. Allin-
son 5 that the proceedings were not binding upon any who were
not served, or made voluntary appearance, and the statute thus
proved abortive as to non-resident stockholders.
To meet this situation, an Act was passed in 189916 provid-
ing for a hearing upon the petition of an assignee or receiver of
the corporation, or any creditor, as to the probable indebtedness
of the company, the expenses of the assignment or receivership,
and the probable assets available, upon which the court shall levy
a ratable assessment upon all stockholders, "taking into account
the probable solvency or insolvency of stockholders and the probable
expenses of collecting the assessment," and shall direct its payment
to the assignee or receiver.', - The statute further provides
(sec. 5) that the' assessment levied shall be conclusive against all
stockholders "whether appearing or having- notice thereof or not,"
as to all matters relating to the amount of and necessity for
the assessment. '
6
This complete change from the originial policy of the legisla-
ture would certainly seem to have imposed new burdens on the
stockholder. In a suit by a receiver of a Minnesota corporation
against a stockholder, resident in Connecticut, and who became
such prior to the Act of z899, the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut held' 7 that it was unconstitutional because of the
impairment in the original obligation of the stockholder. In a
well considered opinion by Mr. Justice Simeon E. Baldwin, it is
pointed out that to the liability originally assumed under the
original Act, there was added the liability as measured by the
13. Gen Stats., chap. 76. sec. 5897-5911.
14. Patterson v. Stewart (iS89) 41 Minn. 84; In re Martin's Estate
(1894) 56 Minn. 420; Hanson v. Davison (1898) 73 Minn. 454.
I5. (19o3) 188 U. S. 56.
x6. Gen. Stats., chap. 272, secs. 1-12.
17. Converse v. Aetna National Bank (i9o6) 64 At. 340. The case is
now pending on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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estimate of the court as to what might be thereafter necessary
for future expenses in future suits to collect what were never
corporate assets, in opposition to which the stockholder might
very well say: "non haec in foedera veni."
So, too, in New York, in a suit against a stockholder of
the same corporation, it was held' 8 that irrespective of whether
the statute did or did not impair vested rights, it failed to grant
due process of law, in that it assumed to make the assessment
proceedings binding upon stockholders not parties to it. The
appearance of the corporation is not sufficient, for the receiver's
right to enforce the liability depends upon his representation
of the creditors, not of the corporation. Even assuming a suc-
cession to rights of the corporation, the latter would then be an
adverse party to the stockholders against whom the liability
was sought to be enforced and the court certainly could not
acquire jurisdiction as against stockholders by making the
adverse party a party to the proceeding. ' 8
The decision in Converse v. Stewart, though not in a court of
last resort, is in line with the settled law of the State. Thus in
an action brought to recover the amount due from a stockholder
of a bank incorporated in the State of Washington, for an equal
and ratable proportion of an alleged deficiency due on account
of stock ownership, pursuant to Washington laws, the Court of
Appeals (per Vann, J.) said:' 9
The stockholders, however, may controvert in our courts all the essen-
tial facts, such as insolvency, the amount of the deficiency, and the like,
whether they are established by the judgment appointing the receiver or not.
They may require strict common-law proof as to all the facts upon which the
deficiency is based, and may contest any unreasonable expenditure in the
conversion of assets and the collection of accounts, including extravagant
allowances to attorneys or counsel.
Notwithstanding this state of the law and the sound reasoning
of the courts in these decisions, the United States Supreme Court
has recently taken a long step toward identifying the corpora-
tion with its individual stockholders even in other than corporate
matters, by making its appearance conclusive upon thent. In
Bernheimer v. Converse,2 0 decided in May, 1907, the defendants'
testators became stockholders in the same Minnesota corporation
i8. Converse v. Stewart (1905) 95 N. Y. Supp. 310. On appeal, after
new trial, the Appelate Division approved the doctrines laid down in its
former opinion. (1907) io2 N. Y- Supp. 1 33. The case is now on appeal to
the Court of Appeals.
19. Howard v. Angle, (rgoo) 162 N. Y. I79.
20. (1907) 2o6 U. S. 516.
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as in the Connecticut and New York litigations, long prior to
x899. The defendants urged, among other things, (x) the uncon-
stitutionality of the later Act for the reason that it impaired
their obligations as fixed by the earlier Act; (2) the lack of due
process of law in authorizing a conclusive judgment against non-
resident, non-appearing stockholders; and (3) that the receiver
had no title to maintain the suit. All of these objections the
court overruled.
Prior to this, the court had been most careful to save these
identical questions in actions not necessarilly involving them. 2 '
Mr. Justice White expressly defined them in Evans v. Nellis. 2 2
In its most recent decision, the court sanctions the extraterritor-
ial enforcement of the liability in terms which are indeed unpre-
cise from the point of view of juridical definition. While
it considers the obligation as "contractual in its nature," yet the
court (per Day, J.) says 23 it is "not entirely contractual and
springs primarily from the law creating the obligation." If this
be true, why should not the right and remedy remain local under
well-known principles of the conflict of laws? "If the cause of
action is one that might have arisen anywhere, then it is transi-
tory; but if it could only have arisen in one place, then it is
local." 2 4 This doctrine was recognized in a well considered case
in New Hampshire involving the extraterritorial enforcement of
the Kansas statute, wherein it is said: 2 5
The organic, or statute, or common law of no State in the Union has con-
ferred upon its courts authority to put into active operative effect, efficient
fier se, the statutes of another State.
In another case 28 in the same jurisdiction, the obligation is
declared to be a "naked, statutory liability, entirely unknown to
the common law, for the indebtedness of the corporation how-
ever it may accrue, whether from the breach of a contract or the
commission of a tort." The theory is in line with the view
expressed nearly one hundred years ago by Judge Story, in a
Federal case, 2 7 that no action in assum.sit would lie in such
cases. The New Hampshire doctrine is followed also in other
jurisdictions. 
2 8
21. Bank v. Converse (1906) 200 U. S. 425.
22. (1902) x87 U. S. 271.
23. At p. 529.
24. Wharton, Conflict of Laws (19o5) sec. 71 r quoting from Judge Cooley.
25. Crifpfen v. Laighton (1899) 69 N. H. 540, 550.
26. Rice v. Hosiery Co. (1875) 56 N. H. 114, 128.
27. Bullardv. Bell, (1817) 1 Mason 243, 300.
28. Bank vi. Farnum, (1898) 2o R. I. 466; Brown v. Eastern State Co.
(x883) X34 Mass. 59o; semble, Lane v. Morris (i85i) io Ga. 162; see Whitford
v. Railroad (1861) 23 N. Y. 465.
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Unfortunately, Mr. Justice Holmes who doubted the result
in the Bernkeirner case did not amplify his views. He simply says:
I regret that the court has thought it unnecessary to state specifically
what contract the stockholder is supposed to have made, as different difficul-
ties beset the different views that might be taken.
And he adds that he finds difficulty in reconciling the con-
struction adopted, with that given to the stronger words of
section 5151 of the National Bank Act in McClaine v. Ran-
kin. 29 That action was brought under the Federal statute
which provides that each stockholder of a national bank shall be
held individually, equally, and ratably, and not one for another,
for all its liabilities to the extent of the amount of his stock in
addition to the amount invested. The statute of limitations of
the State of Washington, wherein the action was brought, pro-
vides a three year period for actions "on contract, or liability
express or implied," not in writing, and a two year period for
other statutory liabilities. The court held that the shorter
period applied, on the ground that the Act does not imply a
promise from the stockholder as surety to the creditor for the
debts of the bank, but merely imposes a liability secondary to
those debts, to which, indeed, the stockholder is not a party. 
2 9
It is but fair to state that two of the learned justices who con-
curred in the Bernheimer case, dissented from the opinion of the
majority in McClaine v. Rankin, but the latter case is strictly in
harmony with the settled doctrines of the Supreme Court. Thus
it has held30 that coverture is no defense to the liability imposed
by the National Bank Act, which it would be, were the liability
"contractual" in any but a loose sense. In fact Mr. Justice
Harlan expressly states that on becoming a stockholder, the
defendant "made, strictly, no direct contract with anyone."
3 0
To the objection that the later Minnesota statute impaired
obligations fixed by the earlier one, the court held that the
Constitution had already fixed the maximum. Yet a reference to
its wording (supra) will show that, of itself, the Constitution does
not indicate to whom the liability runs, and without an obligee,
the provision amounts to no more than a declaration of principle.
29. (x9o5) 197 U. S. 154, i61.
3o. Christopher v. Norvell (x905) 201 U. S. 216. Accord, Robinson v.
Turrentine (1894) 59 Fed. 554, 555, in which the court said that the obliga-
tion grows wholly out of the Act of Congress. So too in McDonald v.
Thompson (1902) 184 U. S. 71, 73, the court said: "There was no contract in
writing with the creditors or depositors of the bank, and none with the bank
itself to which the receiver could be said to be a privy, except to pay for the
stock originally issued."
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Furthermore, it does not seem reasonable to justify the increased
burdens as being incidental to a change in the remedy, when
that "remedy" consists of an assessment embracing such
purposes as the "probable" expenses of the receiver in making
investigations, and conducting suits, successfully or not, against
other stockholders. We do not wish to enter too much at length
upon the discussion of this question, as its significance is limited
to the rights of stockholders who became such prior to the recent
Act. It suffices to say that where the change of remedy effects
a substantial change in the rights of the parties, statutes making
the change have repeatedly been held unconstitutional. 3 1
The importance of the decision lies in the fact that it practi-
cally deprives the stockholder of his day in court on every
question except the fact of stockholdership. As to the regularity
of the proceeding in the foreign court, the necessity for the
receivership, the validity of the claims alleged against the
corporation, the solvency or insolvency of the other stockholders,
and what should be the reasonable expenses of necessary litiga-
tion, he is denied a hearing. The doctrine adopted by the court
is that the stockholders are represented by the corporation; but
it is obvious that a constructive representation such as this must
work peculiar hardship on the absentee stockholders. Normally,
the corporation for all practical purposes will have ceased to
exist and, in fact, in the principal case, the company, at the
time of the sequestration proceeding, had not only ceased to do
any business, but had been stripped of all its property and
franchises. It was therefore incapable in law and fact, of
representing the stockholders or any one else.3 2 Furthermore,
it is doubtful whether the statute itself contemplates any such
representation, the legislature must have foreseen that at the
time of the hearing, the corporation is likely to be defunct, and
the only contesting parties will be the receiver or creditors on
the one hand and the officers or stockholders on the other.
Finally, as to the receiver's capacity to sue in a foreign juris-
diction, the court upheld his right upon the theory that the
statute made him a "quasi-assignee" for the creditors. 3  The
31. State National Bank v. Sayward (1899) 91 Fed. 443; Knickerbocker
Trust Co. v. Cremen (19o5), 140 Fed. 973; Harrison v. Remington Pa er
Co. (igo5) 14o Fed. 385; Allis v. Insurance Co. (1877) 97 U. S. 144; Seibert
v. Lewis (1887) X22 U. S. 284, 297, 299.
32. .Danforth v. Chemical Co. (x897) 68 Minn. 308; Schrader v. Bank
(189o) 133 U. S. 67, 76; Covell v. Fowler (xgo6) 144 Fed. 535, 538.
33. P. 534.
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statute nowhere indicates this, but, on the contrary, speaks
throughout of the receiver as being "of" or "for any such cor-
poration." As the receiver could only take title to corporate
assets and as the right to sue is vested in the creditors and not
in the corporation, the receiver must be purely a statutory one
and therefore properly within the rule of Hale v. Allinson,
(supra).
In conclusion, it may be said that the result reached is
another proof of the dangers involved in the doctrine of judicial
construction. By this process, the most deeply rooted principles
of jurisprudence may gradually be made to give way. A foreign
receiver may now sue in a local jurisdiction, as constructive
("quasi") assignee and successfully urge a conclusive assessment
made in the foreign jtrisdiction pursuant to a contract wholly
constructive, against stockholders, in fact absent and without
notice, but constructively represented by a corporation, in fact
defunct, but constructively still able to represent its stockholders.
Arthur K. Kuhn.
New York.
